THE AUTHORITY OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
FREDERICK SCHAUERt

This symposium is a mixed blessing. On the positive side, all
disciplines, including law, should find it useful to engage in serious
self-reflection and self-criticism. Without it, the contingent methods
and perspectives of the discipline begin to seem inevitable, making
the exploration of alternatives less possible, and the understanding
of the discipline itself less rich. When a discipline challenges its
own understandings, it takes a step towards deeper appreciation of
those understandings themselves.' Because normativity, in the
sense of legal scholarship that attempts to persuade some participant in the legal system-such as ajudge, lawyer, or legislator-to act
in one way rather than another, is now so much the norm, there is
a risk of forgetting that the norm of normativity is contingent and
not inevitable. Insofar as this symposium represents in part an
effort to show that what is now taken for granted could have been
and might yet be otherwise, its consequences (if any) are likely to be
positive.
Yet although this kind of disciplinary introspection can bring
benefits, it may also by symptomatic of, and reinforce, an underlying weakness in the discipline itself. Whatever the virtues of
introspection, the process rarely takes place within disciplines that
are flourishing, and is rarely practiced by those at the center of
flourishing disciplines. Symposia on legal scholarship are, in this
sense, partly the most extreme pathology of the tendency of any
discipline to look increasingly inward as it develops. 2 When
members of the discipline go from talking to each other about the
outside world to talking to each other about how they talk to each
other, it may be strong evidence that something is amiss, or even
stronger evidence of a tendency towards self-indulgence and selft Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University.
I Especially within the domain of professional education, this is not an uncontroversial proposition, for there are those who believe that some unwillingness to
challenge the foundations of a professional discipline is essential to the survival of
that profession and the effective functioning of its members. See; e.g., Carrington, Of
Law and the River, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227-28 (1984).
2 See, e.g., ConstitutionalScholarship: What Next?, 5 CONST. COMM. 17 (1988); Yale
LawJournalSymposium on Legal Scholarship: Its Natureand Purposes,90 YALE L.J. 955
(1981).
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importance-hardly the peculiar provinces of the scholar, but hardly
characteristics unknown in the world of scholarship.A
Still, the particular focus of this symposium holds out some
hope for reconciliation. By critically examining the normative mode
in legal scholarship, the symposium may prompt a re-examination
of the self-importance undergirding much of legal scholarship.
Implicit in the normative rmode is the belief that prescriptive legal
scholarship makes a difference, and makes it sooner rather than
later, but this belief might be mistaken. 4 The conceit of making a
difference in the short or intermediate term-one that many
scholarly enterprises avoid more successfully than legal scholarshiphas both empirical and conceptual components. Because, like most
legal scholars, I unfortunately treat empirical research as a disease
rather than a method, I will stick here to the conceptual side. And
because I have elsewhere expressed my tentative view that normative
legal scholarship, while valuable, should be treated as less dominant
s Lest this sentence be misunderstood, I want to make clear that talk among
scholars about the outside world, rather than talking to the outside world itself, is not
something to be condemned, although I hope that this sentence is also open to
critical evaluation by me and others. A certain form of internal discourse is almost
definitional of scholarship, and the value of scholarship (itself a proposition that
should not be beyond debate) resides in the long-term external benefits of a practice
that is in the short and intermediate term largely internal. For a better (and earlier)
expression of the same idea, see H. PUTNAM, Language and Philosophy, in 2 MIND,
LANGUAGE AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1, 1-3 (1975).

4 For an interesting debate concerning the proposition that the enterprise of
offering theories of adjudication makes a difference to practice, see Laycock,
ConstitutionalTheoty Matters,65 TI.x. L. REv. 767 (1987); Tushnet, Does Constitutional
Theory Matter?: A Commen 65 TEX. L. REV. 777 (1987). To the best of my
knowledge, there has been little work on the impact of normative legal scholarship
on legal and judicial practice, and what work there is has been devoted to the plainly
accessible data provided by citations. See Sirico & Margulies, The Citing of Law
Reviews by the Supreme Court: An EmpiricalStudy, 34 UCLA L. REv. 131 (1986). This
is a useful start, but citation-especially given the much larger role law clerks play in
opinion writing than in case deciding-seems at first to be a poor measure of the
factors that actually influence judicial decisionmaking. Insofar as the entire opinion
is itself possibly a poor indicator of the decision process, the problem is compounded.
See generally Altman, Beyond Candor,89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990) (examining whether
judges' opinions actually reflect-or should reflect-the real reasons for their
decisions).
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a part of legal scholarship than it is now,5 I will stick here to one
narrow conceptual question.
That narrow conceptual question is quite simple: What is the
rhetorical or argumentative status of normative legal scholarship?
What position does the scholar claim, and what is the attitude of the
addressee towards that scholar's product? These are issues of
authority-issues quite familiar to legal scholars, but rarely addressed
in the context of the authority of their own product.
I
Following Hart and Raz, I want to focus on the way in which
authority is, at its core, content-independent.6 Whether it be in the
context of an argument from precedent, 7 an argument for following a rule,8 or an argument for obeying the command of a superior,9 an argument for obedience to authority is an argument for
decision)
taking some directive as a reason for action (or reason for
10
content.
its
of
because
than
rather
source
its
of
because
This is not to say that we do not frequently take directives
seriously because of their content. But when we do so, it is because
we are persuaded by that content rather than by its source. The
notion of content-independence is designed to reflect the difference
5 See Schauer, Constitutional Conventions (Book Review), 87 MICH. L. REv. 1407

(1989); Schauer, JudicialSelf-Understanding and the Internalization of Constitutional
Rules, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 749 (1990). For a more extensive analysis reaching similar
conclusions about the current state of the discipline, but one more charitable to that
current state, see Rubin, The Practiceand Discourseof Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L.
REv. 1835 (1988).
6 See H.L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON
BENTHAM 243, 254-55 (1982); J. RAZ, THE MORALIrY OF FREEDOM 35-37 (1986); see
also Postema, The Normativity ofLaw, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY:
THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 81, 86 (R. Gavison ed. 1987) (discussing Hart's
notion of "content-independent" reasons for obeying authoritative statements or
commands).
7
See Alexander, ConstrainedBy Precedent 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989); Schauer,
Precedent 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
8 SeeJ. RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1975); F. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND
IN LIFE (forthcoming 1991).
9 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 253 ("The commander's expression of will
... is intended to preclude or cut off any independent deliberation by the hearer of
the merits pro and con of doing the act."); Posner, Legal Formalism,LegalRealism,and
the Interpretationof Statutes and the Constitution,37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179, 199-212
(1986) (suggesting a battlefield analogy to the judicial interpretation of statutes).
10 See Regan, Reasons,Authority, andthe Meaningof "Obey": FurtherThoughts on Raz
and Obedience to Law, 3 CANADLN J.L. &JURIS. 3, 7-11 (1990).
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between the soldier who stops because a colleague has pointed out
to him the presence of a mine and the soldier who stops because a
sergeant has ordered him to do so. When the colleague says "Stop!"
and no more, the soldier's first response is likely to be "Why?,"
requesting a reason other than the mere issuance of the directive for
complying with its mandates. But when the sergeant says "Stopl,"
any good soldier knows that the last thing you say is "Why?"
The distinction between authority and persuasion, therefore, is
content-independent and source-based. 11 When the source rather
than the content of a directive is a reason for taking its indications
as a reason for action, an argument from authority in the strict
sense exists. As a result, we can distinguish at the outset two forms
of normative enterprises: the authoritative and the persuasive.
II
Where does legal scholarship fall with respect to this distinction
between the authoritative and the persuasive? No single characterization of the entire universe of legal scholarship is possible,
because it is plain that some legal scholarship purports to be strictly
persuasive, some verges on purporting to be strictly authoritative,
and most involves some combination of both. But let us look more
carefully at all of this, starting with the persuasive.
The term "persuasive" as an indicator of statements that make
a difference because of their content and not because of their
source is a bit misleading. To persuade is to prescribe, or to urge,
but many statements, including those that might be found in legal
scholarship, may make a difference other than by prescription. In
the narrowest sense of the term, not all normative scholarship need
seek to persuade. The most obvious example of this is scholarship
in the nominally descriptive mode that provides information, but
where the information provided may then be of value to those who
would have the power to adopt the position favored by the scholar.
The provision of information may take a number of forms. One
might be that of furnishing legal information, where I use the term
"legal" to refer to a thin and pretheoretical conception of law as
consisting largely of reported cases, statutes, regulations, and
Suppose, for example, I favored
constitutional provisions. 12
11SeeJ. RAZ, THE AuTHORI OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALIlY (1979);
Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 68 MONIST 295 (1985).
12 Actually, I do not think this conception of law is all that thin or pretheoretical,
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recognition of a common law or constitutional right of grandparents
to visit their grandchildren even over the objections of the parents,
and wished to have courts adopt this position. One thing I might
do in furtherance of this goal would be to collect all of the cases
that recognized this or a closely analogous right. In doing so, and
then publishing the results of this enterprise, I would be providing
information that courts (which are supposedly often persuaded by
the actions of other courts) might use, or information that lawyers
1
might use in making arguments to courts.
Alternatively, the information provided might be factual or
empirical rather than legal in my narrow sense of "legal." The
Baldus study that was at the heart of McCleskey v. Kemp 14 did not
need to conclude with the directive, "you, the courts, ought to
declare the death penalty as now practiced to be an invidious and
unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of race" in order to
provide information that those urging that position could use, or
that those inclined to support that position from the bench could
use as well. Similarly, someone in 1973 wishing the Supreme Court
to declare total prohibitions on abortion unconstitutional might
have compiled a compendium of the history of abortion regulation
quite similar to the one that Justice Blackmun in fact did compile
for use in his opinion in Roe v. Wade.15 That compendium, had it
been published or otherwise made available to the lawyers or to the
Court, might have provided useful information for Roe's lawyers, or
useful information for Justice Blackmun and his clerks.
but explaining why is beyond the scope of this essay. See Schauer, Rules and the Rule
of Law (forthcoming 14 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL. (1991)); see also Gavison, Comment, in
ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART, supra
note 6, at 21, 30-31 (referring to "first stage law").
13 Embedded in this sentence is an interesting issue about how, in the crudest
sense, the products of normative legal scholarship get into the hands of, or before the
eyes of (which is hardly the same thing), prospective judicial readers. Although I
want to disclaim (whether successfully or not I will leave to others to decide) any
knowledge of the entrepreneurial side of scholarship, a number of possibilities
present themselves, including presenting ideas in class to students who may then
become law clerks or judges, speaking at judicial conferences, sending reprints to
judges, sending reprints to students who are now law clerks, sending reprints to
parties, appearing as an advocate, writing a brief on behalf of a party or an amicus,
or (rarely) writing a true amicus brief on behalf of only the author of the brief and
only for the purpose of assisting the court, or sitting back and hoping that one's

efforts will be located by the normal methods of legal research. Thus far, there has
been surprisingly scant work done on these aspects of the transmission of legal
information.
14 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
15 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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I intend by all of this to describe the process of providing
information in such a way that the element of the authoritative
drops out. Let me make this clearer with a fictitious example.
Suppose I hire a research assistant to find for me, for one project,
all of the cases and commentary on grandparents' visitation rights,
and, for another project, all of the cases and commentary dealing
with claims that video games are protected by the first amendment
against state and local regulation. In April, I receive the requested
material for both projects. Turning first to that on grandparent's
visitation rights, I find it to have been sloppily executed, including
some cases that would better have been excluded, and, even worse,
omitting some materials directly on point. Shortly thereafter, I turn
my attention to examination grading and then discover, after I
submit my anonymously graded exams, that this same research
assistant has received the lowest grade in my course. 16 And then
I learn from conversations with colleagues that this same person has
done poor work for them on several occasions, and moreover,
apparently performed quite unsatisfactorily at her previous
summer's employment with a law firm.
It is now July, and time to turn in earnest to Video Games and the
FirstAmendment: A HegelianPerspective on Artistic Freedom. What do
I do with the video game-related work product of this same research
assistant? Should I assume it to be of no value whatsoever? Should
I throw it away? I would think not. However much I now distrust
the abilities of the compiler, the compilation itself is still likely to
save me much time and effort, and even if I have to duplicate much
of the work and make sure I read every case with special care, the
compilation itself nevertheless has some value. It will only have the
value it actually has, in the sense that now "my research assistant
said so" is no argument at all, even for me, and nothing upon which
I can rely. But the product may still have worth independent of its
source, perhaps in the same way that anonymously published tracts
like the Federalist Papers and Cato's Letters were assumed in the
eighteenth century to have argumentative utility even if the readers
did not know who wrote them. Similarly, therefore, scholarship that
provides information may be valuable, and may support the
normative goals of the provider of the information, even if the
16 Readers may insert a grade anywhere from B+ to F depending on the practices
of their own institutions.
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reader of the article has no reason whatsoever to trust the provider
of the information.
It should be obvious that the task I have just described is not
likely, to put it mildly, to be the quick route to tenure and fame in
the legal academy. Yet it is important to distinguish the norms of
scholarly evaluation from the potential social worth of the product.
It is not inconceivable that the two might be quite close, but it is
equally conceivable, and more likely in practice, that-the two will
diverge. My aim here is not to talk about the standards for
promotion and tenure in law schools. Still, thinking about those
standards is crucial to thinking about the normativity of legal
scholarship, for it may well be the case that the normative goal,
however dominant it may be, remains ill-served by the incentive
process that supports it.17 But I will not press this digression too
far. My point is only that a work's value in supporting a normative
goal is not the same as its value in securing tenure and fame, unless
the standards for the latter are themselves the former, which is
plainly not the case.
III
Much that I have just said about providing information applies
also to persuasion by argument. I used the examples of the
FederalistPapers and Cato's Letters to show how persuasion may still

occur when there is no source and thus no possibility of sourcebased authority, but the same phenomenon exists even more
pervasively in the context of the lawyer's brief. Because of the
nature of the lawyer's task, the object of persuasion-typically the
judge or law clerk-is hardly likely to take anything said in a brief on
faith, and thus as authoritative in the sense I am discussing. On the
contrary, the reader knows that anything said in the brief is said
from the perspective of a role quite different from that of the
decisionmaker, and consequently the fact of a lawyer's saying it,
apart from what is said, will carry no positive weight for the
17

To make myself a bit clearer, I mean to suggest that if prescriptive scholarship

is thought to be valuable, then more attention might be paid to the actual success of
the prescription, and to the use of those forms of scholarship, some now quite
unfashionable, that increase the likelihood that the prescription will make a
difference. If instead, the standards of evaluation are those of appeal to the scholarly
community itself (as I think they should be), then the dominance of the prescriptive

form seems quite a bit more surprising.
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decisionmaker, and might even carry some negative weight, in the
sense of raising suspicions greater than those that would have been
8
raised by merely anonymous persuasion.1
Despite these reasons for skepticism about what lawyers say on
behalf of their clients, briefs apparently do some good, or at least
the system acts as if they do. 19 I can hardly deal here with the
psychology, sociology, or philosophy of persuasion, but it will be
sufficient to note that people are sometimes persuaded by the
content of a persuasive utterance independent of the source of the
persuasion. Arguments sometimes matter, ideas sometimes matter,
people sometimes change their minds, and even more commonly,
often develop beliefs as to subjects about which they previously had
20

none.

Just as briefs may at times persuade, so may what is essentially
the same style of writing persuade when it takes the form of an
article in a law review. Even if it is clear that the author of the
article is representing (officially or not) a point of view or a litigant,
and thus advocating a result in much the same way that a lawyer
would in a brief, the possibility that the arguments in the article will
themselves have persuasive force independent of their source seems
likely to be roughly the same as the possibility that arguments in a
brief filed in a court will have persuasive force independent of the
source.
18 This gets more complicated once we think of the lawyer as potentially
performing multiple roles, or at least having multiple responsibilities and constituencies within a single role. For example, it may be the lawyer's role as officer of the
court that gives her authority in the sense that courts will take her word for the fact
that language directly quoted from a case in fact appears in that case. And it may be
that other lawyers, such as the Solicitor General of the United States, have roles which
make them partly advocates and partly the repositories of authority.
19 Because almost all of normative legal scholarship presupposes the falsity of
Legal Realism, I will indulge that presupposition here. In fact, I believe the contrarythat within the realm of the appellate decisions that most normative scholarship seek
to influence, Legal Realism is more true than false. See Schauer,Judging in a Corner
of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717 (1988).
20 In saying this, I do not intend to recant my skepticism about the empirical
underpinnings of Enlightenment-inspired "marketplace of ideas" views about public

discourse. See F.

SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY

(1982); cf.

Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86J. PHIL. 5, 5 (1989) ("And how better to discover the
truth than to engage in discussion with anyone and everyone who professes an
answer?"). But even if Ackerman now, Milton then, and many in between have
learned less than the sellers of oatmeal, basketball shoes, and presidential candidates
about the determinants of popular or political (or legal) belief, legal argument surely
presupposes a degree of rationality that must in turn accept the possibility of sourceindependent (and, hopefully, packaging-independent) persuasion.
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Still, minds are not blank slates, and the enterprise of persuasion takes place against a background of prior factual beliefs and
normative opinions held by the addressee of the persuasion. What
a person is likely to believe after persuasion is at least partly a
function of what she believed before persuasion, 21 a factor influencing both how messages are understood and the extent to which
the messages understood will be accepted or rejected. This suggests
that persuasion is likely to be most effective when this background
of prior factual beliefs and normative opinions is thinnest, or, if
thicker, then when conflicting background beliefs are in equipoise. 22 Compare two cases. In one, the author of a law review
article attempts to persuade the Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States to reverse Roe v. Wade.23 In the other, the author
of an article attempts to persuade whatever judges might hear the
issue to interpret sections 514(a) and 514(c)(2) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) as pre-empting
state remedies for wrongful discharge in cases where the discharge
was based on the employer's desire to avoid making pension
payments. 24 I would conjecture that the likelihood of a persuasive
act actually moving the decisionmaker is much greater in the second
case than in the former. In the second case, the decisionmaker's
background set of beliefs is likely to be far less focused on the issues
raised by the case, and those beliefs that are held are likely to be
held with substantially less fervor.
Of course it might be better to think of this as a question of
expected value. If some scholar wants to have the vocation of
influencing the courts in the service of social justice, and if that
scholar believes that abortion rights are a hundred times as
important as ERISA determinations in securing social justice, then
a .05% chance of making a difference with respect to abortion is an
enterprise just as valuable as one that involves a 5% chance of
making a difference with respect to ERISA. 25 Presumably, this
21 See C. CRONKITE, PERSUASION (1969); C. HOVLAND, I. JANIS & H. KELLEY,

COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION (1953); J. KLAPPER, THE EFFECTS OF MASS
COMMUNICATION (1960); Bauer, The ObstinateAudience, in THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS
OF MASS COMMUNICATION 326 (W. Schramm & D. Roberts eds. 1971).
2 Actually, the likelihood of success is greatest when the object of persuasion is
already leaning in the right direction, and may need only a bit of a normative shove
to keep her there.
23 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24 See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990).
25 Any scholar who thinks these numbers too low seems to me to be engaged in
a serious act of self-delusion. If anything, the numbers seem to me to be unrealisti-
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kind of calculation is implicit in various decisions about what to do
with one's life, but it is reasonable to suppose that making the issues
and the relationships more explicit would have beneficial effects.

IV
All of this, however, is about content-dependent persuasion, and
thus assumes a lack of authoritativeness in the sense in which I am
speaking of authority. Might legal scholarship also be authoritative,
as well as being, on occasion, informative or persuasive? That is,
are there circumstances in which a decisionmaker, primarily a court,
would treat the source of a piece of legal scholarship as-an independent reason for taking what that source (i.e., a book or article) says
as a reason for deciding in accordance with what the source

suggests?
Before addressing that question, it may be useful to examine the
sources that might account for source-based authority. One would
be the particular identity of the author. "Holmes said so" counts
for more in legal argument than "Schauer said so," and that is
because something attached to Holmes as a person justifies relying
on him independently of the content of what he is saying on some
particular occasion. I will address presently why this authority
might attach, but I want at the moment only to identify the way in
which, first, it might attach to an individual.
Second, authority might attach not to an individual author but
to her affiliation. Otherwise anonymous people may be validated or
legitimated by their institutions, such that an author hitherto
unknown by the addressee of the article might be taken as authoritative if she is associated with a prestigious institution, 26 less so if
associated with a less prestigious institution of the same genre (a
less prestigious law school, for example), and still less so if associat27

ed with an even less prestigious type of institution.
The third possible locus of authority would be the format of the
publication, by which I mean the class of publication and the rank
within that class that a publication may have, all as seen by the
objects of the prescription. 28 Again, some law reviews are more

cally high.

26 And that is why it matters far less where one winds up than where one starts.
27 Think of the likely reaction if the author of a law review article were identified

not as "Professor of Law, Siwash University," but as "Headnote Writer, West
Publishing Company," or "Citation Compiler, Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, Inc."
28 The previous clause is important. Authority exists when, and only when, the
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prestigious, and thus more likely to be authoritative than others,
and within the realm of legal writing, most law reviews are more
authoritative than many other forms of publication. Even assuming
author anonymity, "as it says in the Siwash Law Review" is more
likely to be taken as authoritative than "as was written in the Parade
Sunday Supplement." And depending on the audience, "as it says
in CorpusJurisSecundum" may be more authoritative than "as it says
in the Harvard Law Review," which for some audiences is in turn
likely to be much more authoritative than "as Habermas says."
V
But why might any of these factors-author identity, author
affiliation, or format of publication-be taken as authoritative? Why
might any of these source-based rather than content-based factors
provide added legitimacy for the content of what was said? In this
context, three reasons seem the most likely candidates, and I want
29
to treat them in turn.
First is what we might call "effort-based authority." With some
frequency, we rely on the fact that others have engaged in some task
that we have neither the time nor the inclination to duplicate.
Suppose I want to know the square root of 134 to 23 places, or the
day of the week on which January 15, 1996 will fall. I could work
out the answers, but in place of doing- the calculations myself, I
could look up the results in any of a number of standard reference
books. The authors of those books have already done the work, I
might think, so why should I duplicate it? And since I have
0
independent confirmation of the accuracy of the work they do,
I take their results, standing alone, as authoritative. I would be less
inclined to take the results as authoritative had the same results
come from a less trustworthy source.
Effort-based authority exists in legal scholarship as well, but it
appears to be less prevalent than in the past, largely for the same
subject of a directive treats what is said as authoritative. Authority is in this sense
significantly subject-relative.
' As should be apparent, many of the standard reasons for recognizing

authority-maximizing predictability or certainty, increasing stability for stability's
sake, solving Prisoner's Dilemma or coordination problems, ensuring a cohesive
community, and effecting a division of labor-seem (except for perhaps the last) quite
inapt in this context.
30 1 believe, for example, that a book of square roots published in its third
printing by a reputable publisher would not have reached this stage if the square
roots published were incorrect.
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reasons that compilatory treatises and their equivalents are less

prevalent than in the past. Some of this relates to the incentives
that now exist in the legal academy (would Williston get tenure
today if Williston wrote Williston today?). And part of it relates to
the ways in which loose-leaf services, computerized legal research,
and other changes in the provision of legal information have now

made textual compilations ]less necessary. Still, there have been in
the past and remain today equivalents in legal scholarship to the
compilations of square roots and dates in future years. If a lawyer
were to say in a brief that "Wigmore cites no case in which a parrot

has been permitted to testify," the claim embedded in that proposition, that Wigmore read all the cases and found no cases allowing

parrots to testify, is not that different from the claim implicit in
relying on compilations of dates or square roots-here the reliance
is placed on Wigmore's efforts, and these efforts have proved
thorough in the past.3 1 Similarly, when a scholar, known to be
reliable, reports that the overwhelming majority of cases says this or
that, or that the French law on such-and-such a point is the same as
the American, we rely on the fact that someone else's efforts
provide reasons for taking what she said seriously.
Alternatively, authority in the context of legal scholarship may
be "process-based." Here I do not mean to call on any narrow or
law-based notion of "process." Rather, I want to suggest that, under
some circumstances, the way in which someone has reached a
conclusion might give that conclusion independent legitimacy, and,
consequently, authority. Here we can think of some number of
processes that might be relevant, such as double- or triple-checking
of results, guarantees against bias, or peer review as practiced in
some number of academic disciplines, although generally (and
unfortunately) not in law. Suppose that legal scholars were
constrained by conflict-of-interest rules as stringent as those applied
to judges, that they were constrained by an obligation to cite to
opposing authority that was substantially stricter than the existing
similar obligation now applied to practicing lawyers, that all journal
submissions were blind reviewed by three reviewers before publica311 use this example because I have the recollection from law student days of
seeing every day outside ofJames Chadbourn's office the latest deliveries of aU of the
federal and regional reporters. Part of how he defined his task included readingevety
evidence case decided by every American court. I hope it comes as no surprise to the
readers of this article that there were few emulators of Chadbourn's practice then,
and far fewer now.
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dion, that every article was subject to the kind of substantive citechecking that occasionally still takes place with some law reviews,
and that no article could be published unless accompanied by a
written opposing commentary of a scholar of equivalent stature. I
make no claim that the results of such a combination of processes
would necessarily be correct in some ultimate or foundational sense,
but it still seems likely that many people would suppose that any
article that had survived this rigorous a process would bring with it
sufficient assurances of comparative soundness such that it would
be sensible to give the products of that process some degree of
32
source-based authority.
Finally, authority might be based on the subject's view about the
greater expertise of the authority. 33 When I take the medication
prescribed by my physician, or cancel a holiday because of the
weather forecast provided by a meteorologist, or follow the
instructions on how to set up my computer, I am not, except in the
most attenuated sense, merely saving time. By the time I train
myself to be a meteorologist, even supposing I could, it would be
too late to decide what to do next week. And in many other areas,
I rely on an expertise I could never hope to attain, giving someone
appropriately validated as an expert-whether by credentials, past
performance, or validation by someone whose expertise as a
validator of experts I respect-a degree of authority such that what
they say is for me a reason for acting in accordance with it just
because they have said it.
My sense-and here I am being even more impressionistic than
I have been throughout the balance of this article-is that expertisebased authority presents the greatest dilemma for the legal scholar
engaged in normative legal scholarship. We want to persuade the
decisionmaking readers of our normative scholarship, but if we
cannot do so, then we will settle for relying on our own expertise as
a second best. Or perhaps I have it backwards. We would prefer
that our expertise be acknowledged and our utterances be taken as
authoritative, but failing that, we hope that we are persuasive for
content-dependent reasons. But whatever is going on, there is little
-2 Much of the authority of scientific inquiry is based on this kind of process-based
control, including the special feature of replicability of results not wholly applicable
to legal scholarship.
-'On
expertise as an argument for authority, see Green, Law, Legitimacy, and
Consent 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 795, 803-04 (1989).
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doubt that comparative expertise is a significant part of the
authoritative component of normative legal scholarship.
If this is so, then it is likely that the argument for expertise as
a reason for acknowledging authority will be strongest when the
subject perceives the greatest gap in expertise. A citation to Loss on
Securities Regulation or Areeda on Antitrust is likely more authoritative
in the Barnstable Superior Court than it would be in the Second
Circuit, just as Martindale-tlubbell'ssummary of the Austrian law of
intestate succession is likely to carry much more weight in an
American court than the same citation would carry in Vienna.
These examples point us in the direction of the extreme case,
the case in which the addressee of a prescription can see no reason
for acknowledging the greater expertise of the prescriber. When
the normative purchase for a prescription with respect to a matter
of legal change is a question of politics, morality, or public policy,
there is little reason to expect that the typical addressee of a work
of normative legal scholarship will acknowledge the comparative
expertise of the typical prescriber. The typical legal scholar's views
about abortion or affirmative action, however sincerely held or
carefully worked out, or however correct, are unlikely to be
acknowledged by the typical judge as coming from a vantage point
of superior expertise. Here, as an empirical matter, the argument
for comparative expertise as a source of authority is likely to be
4
weakesta

34 Note that I am making a psychological and empirical claim and not a
metaethical one. I am inclined to think that there is moral and political and policy
knowledge, and that some people are better at working these things out than others.
But this claim is independent of my claim that most addressees of prescriptive legal
scholarship would not acknowledge the comparative expertise that I believe both can
and does exist (which is not to say that legal scholars are necessarily the ones who
possess it).
Recognizing that the scholar's own comparative advantage as political or moral
reasoner is likely to be under-appreciated, a common tendency is to rely on the
authority of others, usually from other disciplines. It is valuable to point a reader to
useful literature, and both valuable and honest to attribute non-original ideas to their
proper source. But all too often the reliance on Rawls or Rorty as authority is used
merely as a substitute for an argument when there is no good reason for not
providing one.
Moreover, the fact of greater expertise is not a conclusive argument for deferring
to it. In many contexts, independent values allocate decisionmaking authority to
those who are not best at using it. Just as we do not put the care of all children into
an elite of expert child-raisers, so too might we not want to put the making of
6political and moral decisions, decisions that necessarily provide almost all of the
purchase for legal change, into a group of experts, even were such experts to exist.
"[T]here are profound moral objections to a society run by experts, objections which
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VI
Although I have separated three sources of authority-individual,
institutional, and format-and three reasons for acknowledging
authority-effort-based, process-based, and expertise-based-I make
no claim that these ideal types occur in the real world in such
pristine form. They are much more likely combined, as when, for
example, the impossibility of reading everything (the effort-based
constraint) leads one first to read those books and articles written
either by acknowledged experts or people at prestigious institutions
or published in prestigious journals or by prestigious book publishers. Still, although my distinctions are crisper than real life, these
distinctions and associated conceptual tools may provide assistance
to those who would wish to examine these issues either more
empirically or more normatively.
Implicit in what I have said, however, is that although I
frequently have sympathy for arguments from and for authority,
many of those arguments seem strangely ill-suited to the academic
enterprise, and perhaps equally ill-suited to the use of legal
scholarship as authority by actual decisionmakers such as judges.
Perhaps it would be better if judges instructed their law clerks to
give them law review articles with the names of the authors, their
affiliations, and the names of the journals expunged, or to give
them passages from books with again the names, affiliations, and
publishers eliminated, so that only the persuasive or informational
value would seep through. But, again, life is short, time is limited,
and people are better at some things than they are at others. For
all of these good reasons, and an even larger number of bad ones,
legal scholarship may at times be treated as more authoritative than
a perfectly rational decisionmaking environment would allow.
Again, in an ideal world, one might expect scholars to fight this
phenomenon rather than to contribute to it. But whether this is the
case, and if so to what extent, is something that is best left to each
scholar's individual self-reflection.

are rooted in the values of self-government and political equality." Id. at 804.

